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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP UTAH 
GLENN BASS and LOIS BASS, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees 
v. No. 19182 
PLANNED MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., 
a Utah corporation, et a_l. , 
Defendants and Appellant 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Glenn Bass and Lois Bass, plaintiffs and appellees herein, 
respectfully petition this Honorable Court for a rehearing of the 
above-entitled case. This petition is based on the grounds that 
I. THE COURT OVERLOOKED CERTAIN MATERIAL FACTS 
THAT ESTABLISH PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION; 
and, in addition, 
II. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE WARRANT THE 
EXTENSION OR MODIFICATION OF EXISTING LAW. 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs and appellees herein pray 
that Part I of the judgment and opinion of this Honorable Court 
in this case (that the elements of slander of title were not made 
out) be re-examined and reversed. 
Respectfully submitted by 
MARINUS HEYMERING, JR. 
2729 Kenton Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Attorney for Petitioners 
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and/or a good faith argument for the extension or modification of 
existing law and not for delay or any other improper purpose. 
Mariettas Heymering, Jr. 
Attorney for Petitioners 
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ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs and appellees respectfully submit that this 
Honorable Court overlooked certain material facts and that the 
circumstances of this case warrant the extension or modification 
of existing law. 
Clearly existing Utah law requires the plaintiff in an 
action for slander of title to prove special damages, i.e., 
palpable economic loss. Equally clear is that attorney fees may 
not serve that purpose when they are incurred in the prosecution 
of that action, but only when they have already been incurred of 
necessity to remove an impediment or to correct a harm caused by 
the slander, as in an action for quiet title to remove a specious 
lien. In this respect, Justice Stewart's opinion, in which the 
rest of the court joined unanimously, cannot be faulted. 
However, the emphasis in the briefs and at oral argument 
before this Honorable Court on the issue of attorney fees may 
well have served to obscure the fact that other special damages 
were proved at trial as an element of the slander of title cause 
of action. Thus, the cause of action was in fact made out. 
Additionally, where (as is the case here) actual harm has 
resulted from the intentional commission of an economic tort, the 
law should allow an award of punitive damages, and it should do 
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so even if the amount or extent of actual damage cannot be 
ascertained in money value. Thus, the trial court's award of 
$8,000 in attorney fees on the slander of title should be upheld 
as punitive damages constituting a reasonable punishment and 
deterrent for such conduct in this case. 
I. THE COURT OVERLOOKED CERTAIN MATERIAL FACTS 
THAT ESTABLISH PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION. 
The material facts are as follows. In August 1978 the 
Basses had an option to buy the defendants Trimbles' mobile home. 
Bass v. Planned Management Services, Inc., No. 19182, slip op. 
at 1 (Utah August 18, 1988). The option was good until October 
31, 1978. I<d. at 1. In August 1978 the Basses employed a real 
estate agent to sell the mobile home. Id. at 2. Defendant Tommy 
Spilker testified that he told some prospective buyers_ that legal 
problems needed to be straightened out before they bought the 
home. Id. at 2. (At the time, Spilker was a servant of 
defendant Planned Management Services (PMS). Ici. at 1, 2.) 
Additionally, Spilker changed the locks on the mobile home and 
removed the real estate agent's lockbox in mid-October 1978, 
which denied the Basses and their real estate agent access to the 
home. Icl. at 2, 5. When the Basses' option to buy expired at 
the end of October 1978 the Trimbles reposessed the mobile home 
and engaged Spilker to sell it, which he did shortly thereafter. 
Id. at 2. 
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The trial court found as a fact, both before and after PMS 
filed its objections to the findings of fact, conclusions of law 
and judgment of the trial court, that Spilker made false 
statements about the property to at least one potential buyer 
with the intent to prevent the Basses from selling it. Record at 
120-121, 161. Likewise the trial court found as a fact, both 
before and after PMS1 objection, that Spilker changed the locks 
on the mobile home and removed the lockbox with the intent to 
prevent the Basses from selling it. Record at 120-121, 161. 
Spilkerfs actions in changing the locks and removing the 
lockbox without privilege to do so spoke even louder than his 
words the (false) assertion that the Basses had no right to 
possess or sell the mobile home. This assertion was not only 
false but it also disparaged the Basses' legitimate title 
interest in the mobile home and it cast a larger and more 
definite cloud over the Basses' title interest than the filing of 
a wrongful lien would have. The assertion was also clearly 
malicious because it was made with the intent to prevent the 
Basses from selling the mobile home, and because it evidenced a 
clear disregard for the Basses' title interest and an intent to 
vex them and injure their prospective economic interests.^ 
•• < 
1. Judge Durham did state from the bench at the conclusion 
of the trial that: "The court further finds that Mr. Spilker 
interfered with the Basses' efforts to sell their trailer home 
prior to November 1, 1978, and I can make no finding that that 
was malicious, willful or wanton." Record at 601. The trial 
court's oral comments from the bench have no force or effect. 
(continued...) 
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See, e.g., Bennion v. Hansoi I, 699 P.2d 75 7, 780 (Utah 1984); 
State v. Wade, 572 P.2d 398, 399 n.3 (Utah 1977); and McCollum 
v. Clothier, 121 Utah 311, 241 P.2d 468 1 72 (I Utah 1952), She 
took the matter under advisement and later issued a memorandum 
opinion in which she specifically found that "Spilker's changing 
of the locks was not in good faith." Record at 1 21. Her finding 
was reaffirmed by Judge Fishier after PMS objected. Record at 161. 
2, Proof of the loss of any sale of the slandered property 
i s not required to sustain an action for slander of title i n 
Utah. Dowse v. Doris Trust, 116 Utah 10 6, 2 08 P.2d 9 56, 959 
(Utah. 1949). A_ fortiori , proof that de f e n d a n tl s a c t i o n s c a u s e d 
such a loss is not required to sustain the action. 
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slandered while the Basses were entitled to posess and sell it 
makes his conduct all the more reprehensible. 
II. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE WARRANT THE 
EXTENSION OR MODIFICATION OF EXISTING LAW. 
As Justice Stewart correctly observed, the essence of 
slander of title is the interference with economic interests 
rather than any injury to reputation. Bass, slip op. at 3-4. It 
is the policy of Utah, as indeed it should be, to protect the 
economic interests of its citizens from interference. For 
example, this Honorable Court recently recognized the common law 
tort of intentional interference with prospective economic 
relations. Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 
304 (Utah 1982). In light of this and other developments in the 
law, the circumstances of this case warrant the following 
extensions or modifications of existing law. 
A. PROOF OF SPECIAL DAMAGES SHOULD NO LONGER BE REQUIRED AS AN 
ELEMENT OF SLANDER OF TITLE WHERE THE TORT IS COMMITTED 
INTENTIONALLY. 
The existing law of slander of title requires proof of 
special damages in order to prevail. There are no general or 
presumed damages in this cause of action. The reason for this 
lies principally in the antiquated distinction between trespass 
and trespass on the case. "[W]hether such [actual] damage is 
essential to the existence of a cause of action for a particular 
7 
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The facts in this case show that defendant PMS, through its 
servant Tommy Spilker, took several affirmative actions with the 
intent to prevent the Basses from selling the mobile home. The 
Basses were unable to sell the mobile home (whether or not 
proximately caused by defendants1 actions). PMS profited from 
Spilker's sale of the mobile home shortly after the Basses1 
interest (option to buy) expired. The harm intended (and not 
merely wished for) by defendants did occur. The Basses' loss is 
actual (if not quantifiable) and the defendants profited from 
Spilker's conduct, which was improper both in purpose (to 
frustrate the Basses' right to sell) and in means (e.g., changing 
the locks without privilege to do so). 
Whether or not it finds that the facts discussed above in 
Point I show actual damages in connection with the slander of 
title cause of action, this Honorable Court should find that the 
egregious nature of defendant Spilker's intentional conduct 
warrants judgment for the plaintiffs for slander of title. Other 
courts have already shown the way. See Paulson v. Kustom 
Enterprises, Inc.y 157 Mont. 188, 483 P.2d 708, 716 (Mont. 1971) 
(involving an action for slander of title and citing as the 
existing law of Montana Fauver v. Wilkoske, 123 Mont. 228, 211 
P.2d 420 (Mont. 1949) for the proposition that punitive damages 
I 
may be awarded even though the amount or extent of actual damages 
cannot be shown; a fortiori a cause of action would be made out). 
9 
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The elements of a cause of action for intentional 
interference with prospective economic relations are "(1) that 
the defendant intentionally interfered with plaintiff's existing 
or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or 
by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff." Leigh 
Furniture, supra 657 P.2d at 304. In this case, defendant 
Spilker intentionally interfered with both the Basses' present 
right to posess and with their potential economic gain from the 
sale of the mobile home. Record at 120-121, 161. Spilker did so 
both with an improper motive (to frustrate the Basses' right to 
sell) and by improper means (false remarks in derogation of the 
Basses' title; changing the locks in derogation of the Basses' 
title). Id. Spilker's actions caused injury to the Basses: not 
only actual damages of $76.70 for 10 days' disposession, but also 
irreparable harm for the frustration of their potential to profit 
from the sale of the mobile home. 
< 
C. SUBSTANTIAL PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD BE AWARDED UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE DESPITE THE PAUCITY OF ACTUAL 
DAMAGES. 
( 
It is well settled that punitive damages may be awarded in 
actions for slander of title. Olsen v. Kidman, 120 Utah 443, 
253 P.2d 510 (Utah 1951); Dowse v. Doris Trust, 116 Utah 106, 
208 P.2d 956 (Utah 1949). Punitive damages may also be awarded 
in actions for intentional interference with prospective economic 
relations. Leigh Furniture, supra 657 P.2d at 312-313. 
( 
11 
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The general rule in Utah is that the purposes of punitive 
damages are: 
* * * [A] punishment of the defendant for particularly 
grievous injury caused by conduct which is not only 
wrongful, but which is wilfull and malicious so that it 
seems to one's sense of justice that mere recompense for 
actual loss is inadequate and that the plaintiff should have 
added compensation; and that the defendant should suffer 
some additional penalty for that character of wrongful 
conduct; and also that such a verdict should serve as a 
wholesome warning to others not to engage in similar 
misdoings. 
Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354, 359 (Utah 1975) quoted with 
approval in Leigh Furniture, supra 657 P.2d at 312. The general 
rule in Utah is also that the amount of punitive damages awarded 
should ordinarily bear some reasonable (aliquot) relation to the 
award of compensatory damages (Prince v. Petersen, 538 P.2d 1325 
(Utah 1975)), but such a consideration is only one among many. 
Leigh Furniture, supra 657 P.2d at 312. 
The facts adduced at trial support an award of substantial 
punitive damages in this case pursuant to the policy set forth in 
Kesler v. Rogers, supra. Olson v. Kidman, 120 Utah 443, 235 P.2d 
510 (Utah 1951); Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., 116 Utah 106, 208 P.2d 
956 (Utah 1949); cf. Sproule v. Parks, 116 Utah 368, 210 P.2d 436 
(Utah 1949) (punitive damages not awarded on appeal where they 
were not awarded at trial).3 But see Nash v. Craigco, Inc., 585 
J
. Justice Stewart's opinion in this case characterizes the 
trial court's award of attorney fees as "special damages" and 
"gratuitous." Bass, slip op. at 4. In fact, although the record 
would support such an inference, it is not at all clear that the 
award of attorney fees was intended to be compensatory. The 
(continued...) 
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P.2d 775 (Utah 1978) (action in equity) (in which this Honorable 
Court reversed the trial court's denial of punitive damages and 
stated that the amount of punitive damages should be determined 
from the nature of the conduct rather than the amount of 
compensatory damages). 
Some courts have held that punitive damages may be awarded 
even in the absence of actual or compensatory damages. See, 
e.g., Nappe v. Anschelewitz, 97 N.J. 37, 477 A.2d 1224 (N.J. 
1984); Fauver v. Wilkoske, 123 Mont. 228, 211 P.2d 420 (Mont. 
1949). 
Because of the fortuitous circumstances that an injured 
plaintiff failed to prove compensatory damages, the 
defendant should not be freed of responsibility for 
aggravated misconduct. People should not be able with 
impunity to trench upon a right. 
Nappe v. Anschelewitz, supra 477 A.2d at 1231. 
Whether or not it finds that the facts discussed above in 
Point I show actual (special) damages in connection with a cause 
of action for slander of title or intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations, this Honorable Court should award 
J(...continued) 
trial court's memorandum opinion states simply that "Plaintiffs 
are entitled to judgment * * * for attorney's fees on the slander 
of title (See Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., 116 U. 107 (1949))." 
Record at 122. It is also plausible, though equally unclear, 
that the award was intended to be punitive. The amount to be 
awarded for attorney fees was still subject to proof when the 
trial court's memorandum opinion was filed. Id. It is difficult 
to conceive that such unliquidated damages would be considered 
special damages. 
13 
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substantial punitive damages to plaintiff. A reasonable measure 
of punitive damages in this case is the sum of $8000 awarded by 
the trial court. See generally Annot., 40 ALR4th 11, §4 at 28-
33f §15 at 88-93, and §16(e) at 99-101 (1985); Annot., 7 ALR4th 
1220 (1981); and Annot., 30 ALR3d 1443 (1970). 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs and appellees 
pray this Honorable Court to grant their petition for rehearing, 
reverse its decision with respect to its finding of no cause for 
slander of title, and reinstate the trial court's award of $8000 
plus interest as punitive damages. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31 ^ ~day of fh^wjT' , 1988 
MARINUS HEYMERING, JR. 
Attorney for Petitioners 
(Plaintiffs and Appellees) 
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